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Abstract 
By focusing on the constructive and combative spillover effects of the firms’ investment in 
research and development (R&D), we develop a horizontally differentiated duopoly model in 
which R&D investment used to improve product quality influences consumer preferences and 
the choice of consumption goods. Applying the framework of endogenous timing decisions to 
the model, we examine the mutually beneficial timing of product R&D investment and 
demonstrate that, if there are asymmetric demand spillovers between the firms, a natural 
Stackelberg equilibrium persists in noncooperative product R&D investment competition in 
which the firm producing the product with weaker (stronger) demand spillovers moves first 
(second) to commit to the investment, regardless of the mode of competition. We consider the 
outcome of the endogenous timing decisions, based on the view of “endogenous sunk costs 
(i.e., The Sutton Approach)”. Furthermore, we address process R&D investment competition 
with technology spillovers under endogenous timing. 
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Purpose  
We develop a horizontal product differentiation model that includes product research and 
development (R&D) investment with demand spillovers in pre-market competition. Applying 
the framework of endogenous timing decisions − i.e., the extended game with observable 
delay developed by Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) − to the developed model, the first purpose 
of the paper is to demonstrate how the order of product R&D investment is endogenously 
determined in the presence of demand spillovers. Thus, in a Stackelberg (sequential) game, 
the order of the moves of players is exogenously given; if we permit players to move 
simultaneously or sequentially, the distribution of moves can be determined. We consider 
under what conditions the first- or second-mover advantage persists for players. We 
demonstrate the counterintuitive outcome that a small firm with small demand spillovers (and 
a small effect on the market) commits to the investment first, whereas a large firm with large 
demand spillovers commits to the investment second. This order of investments is benefits 
both firms. Thus, the small firm gets a share of the market enhancement generated by the 
product R&D of the large firm. In other words, the small firm employs a free-ride strategy.1  
   The other purpose of this paper is to explain the economic implications of product R&D 
investment under endogenous timing by employing the perspective of “endogenous sunk 
costs”, i.e., the Sutton approach (see Sutton, 1989, 1991, 1998; Etro, 2007, 2013). As shown 
below, that approach posits that the size of product R&D investment under endogenous timing 
represents entry costs and the level of quality. Furthermore, the difference in the size of the 
                                                 
1 Lee et al. (1999) address whether small and medium enterprises can free-ride on the large 
firm’s market development efforts, taking into account their resource disadvantage. 
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investments between the firms depends on the difference in the degree of spillovers and 
product substitutability. Accordingly, the natural Stackelberg equilibrium under asymmetric 
spillovers implies that the small (large) firm enters to the market first (second) – incurring low 
(high) entry costs in the pre-market competition − and competes on quantities or on prices, 
providing a low (high) quality product. 
 
1.2 Literature 
There have been various contributions to the related literature analyzing the choice of the 
respective roles for firms in a market (or the timing decision for strategic variables such as 
price, quantity, process and product R&D investment, advertising, and other firm activities). 
For instance, Bulow, et al. (1985) demonstrate that a firm prefers to be a leader (follower) if 
the strategic relationships between the applicable firms indicates that the firms are substitutes 
(complements) with respect to relevant strategic variables (i.e., price and quantity), or 
equivalently, if the slopes of the reaction functions are negative (positive) in the relevant 
space. In particular, when goods are substitutes, if the firms compete on quantities (prices), a 
strategic substitute (complement) relationship holds between them. Thus, both firms prefer to 
be a leader (follower), such that the firms would engage in a simultaneous Nash game, as 
opposed a sequential Stackelberg game. Gal-Or (1985) and Boyer and Moreaux (1987) have 
shown these results in the case of horizontal product differentiation.2 
   Based on a horizontally differentiated duopoly model with a linear demand and 
asymmetric constant marginal costs, Yang et al. (2009) compare price and quantity 
competition under endogenous timing and demonstrate that endogenous timing in the 
                                                 
2  However, Albaek (1990) shows that the Stackelberg equilibrium is endogenously 
determined given cost uncertainty, in which the firm with the larger (smaller) cost variance 
will be the leader (follower). 
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Bertrand duopoly leads to two sequential move games, in which one firm moves first and the 
other moves second. Furthermore, these authors show that endogenous timing in the Cournot 
duopoly leads to a simultaneous move game, in which both firms move first. Recently, 
Tremblay et al. (2011) develop a model in which both the timing of play and the strategic 
choice variables (quantity and price) are endogenous. The authors show that the dynamic 
Cournot-Bertrand outcome can be a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, in which the firm 
choosing quantity (price) moves first (second). 
   With respect to the literature analyzing non-price market competition such as R&D 
investment and advertising under endogenous timing, Amir et al. (2000) – in an analysis that 
is somewhat similar to the analysis in the present paper − consider the endogenous timing of 
process (i.e., cost-reducing) R&D investment with technology spillovers, applying 
D’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) and De Bondt and Henriques (1995).3 In particular, it is 
assumed in these papers that a spillover effect arises because a rival firm’s R&D investment 
stimulates the availability of technological knowledge (i.e., incoming spillovers). These 
authors demonstrate the existence of a unique equilibrium in the assignment of the leader and 
follower roles in which the stronger firm that is better at absorbing knowledge spillovers leads 
and the other firm follows.  
By contrast, Atallah (2005) assumes that a spillover effect arises in the form of leakage of 
technological information from a rival firm’s R&D investment. In this case, the outcome is 
the opposite of that presented by Amir et al. (2000) and others. In other words, the first mover 
is a firm that suffers only a small leakage of technological knowledge from its own process 
R&D investment. We address process R&D investment competition with technology spillover 
                                                 
3 De Bondt and Henriques (1995) assume asymmetric spillover between firms. See Tesoriere 
(2008) and Vandekerckhove and De Bondt (2008). 
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under endogenous timing and focus on two types of technology spillovers, i.e., incoming and 
leakage spillovers.  
   In the analysis of process R&D investment competition under endogenous timing, 
researchers address the technology-side spillovers among firms or intra-industry (i.e., 
business to business). However, this paper focuses on demand-side spillovers (i.e., business to 
(potential) customers) and addresses demand-enhancing investments such as product R&D 
investment (i.e., quality-improving) and advertising. As discussed above, by introducing the 
effect of product R&D investment on the demand side into the conventional utility function, 
we develop a horizontally differentiated duopoly model (e.g., Boyer and Moreaux, 1987; 
Häckner, 2000).4  
At this juncture, we should note that, because product R&D investment affects consumer 
preferences and the demand side of the market, the investment considered in our model 
resembles persuasive advertising. In this case, following the terminology that Marshall (1919, 
pp. 304–307) uses to explain the effects of advertising, we consider both the combative and 
constructive effects associated with product R&D investment on the demand side. Regarding 
the combative effect, an increase in product R&D investment by a firm poaches the customers 
of the rival firm, thereby reducing the profits of the rival. However, an increase in product 
R&D investment by a firm may also attract new customers from outside markets and expand 
the potential size of the market. As a result, product R&D investment can also increase the 
customers of the rival firm and increase the profits of the rival. We refer to this result as the 
constructive effect of product R&D investment. 
Similar issues have also received attention in the context of a vertically differentiated 
                                                 
4 In a different context, Gavazza (2011) theoretically and empirically considers the role of 
demand for firms’ product varieties and demand spillovers in determining market conduct and 
market structure in the mutual fund industry. Furthermore, Cleff et al. (2009) empirically 
address demand-oriented innovation strategy in the European energy production sector. 
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duopoly model with fixed convex cost of quality. For example, Aoki and Prusa (1997) and 
Aoki (2003) demonstrate that firms select distinctive qualities and that a firm producing a 
high-quality product earns higher profits than a firm producing a low-quality product, 
regardless of the mode of competition. In this case, the leader (or follower) in a sequential 
Stackelberg game must decide to produce a high- (or low-) quality product. However, because 
both firms prefer to commit to the production of a high-quality product, they both choose to 
move first. 
Lambertini (1996, 1999) considers endogenous timing with a vertically differentiated 
Bertrand duopoly and demonstrates that if firms endogenously decide the timing of quality 
choices, only simultaneous-move equilibria can arise. Jinji (2004) also examines this issue in 
the context of a vertically differentiated Cournot duopoly and demonstrates that the outcomes 
of the endogenous timing game depend on whether firms are able to choose their relative 
position in the quality space before deciding the timing of quality choices. In other words, if 
firms cannot select their relative position, similar to the result in Lambertini (1999), only 
simultaneous move equilibria persist. In this case, the firms have an incentive to move first 
because the first mover can earn higher profits than the second mover. Alternatively, if both 
firms can choose their relative position, only sequential-move equilibria emerge. In this case, 
the firm choosing the production of the low- (high-) quality product decides to be the first 
(second) mover. In other words, the strategic complement (substitute) relationship for the firm 
producing a low (high)-quality product holds in the quality space. 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we develop a 
horizontally differentiated Cournot duopoly model based on the assumption of a quasilinear 
utility function that incorporates demand spillovers associated with product R&D investments. 
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In Section 3, we first consider the strategic relationships between firms and demonstrate the 
existence of the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) in the noncooperative product 
R&D investment competition. Then, applying the framework of endogenous timing decisions 
to the developed model, we consider the mutually beneficial timing of product R&D 
investments and demonstrate the existence of a natural Stackelberg equilibrium under 
asymmetric demand spillovers. Furthermore, we consider the economic implication of the 
outcomes in the endogenous timing game, based on the view of “endogenous sunk costs”, i.e., 
the Sutton approach. In Section 4, we examine the endogenous timing decision in the cases of 
process R&D investment competition in the presence of two types of technology spillovers. 
Next we address the case of a horizontally differentiated Bertrand duopoly. Finally, in Section 
5, we summarize the main results and discuss some remaining issues. 
 
 
2. The model 
 
2.1 Demand function and product R&D investment with demand spillovers 
We assume a duopolistic Cournot competition in a market with horizontally differentiated 
products. The firms compete in a two-stage game. In Stage 1, each firm simultaneously 
chooses product R&D investment, ,ix  and in Stage 2, each firm simultaneously chooses 
output, ,iq .2,1=i  We confine our attention to the SPNE in the two-stage game by solving 
the model using backward induction. 
We focus on the spillover effects generated by product R&D investment on the demand 
side. In particular, we consider whether an increase in product R&D investment increases the 
willingness to pay of consumers for these products, thus expanding the potential size of the 
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market, which may also increase demand for the rival firm’s products. To highlight this effect, 
we assume that the utility function of a representative consumer is given by  
[ ] ,,; 0212,1 qxxqqUV +=  and 
( ) ( ) [ ]( ) [ ] [ ]{ },,
2
1
222111212121
2
2
2
121 qxqxqqxxqqqqqqU ωωqα +++Ω+





 −+−+= (1) 
where 0q  is the consumption of the outside (numeraire) good and ,10 =p  ,0>α  and 
( )1,0∈q  is a parameter representing the degree of substitutability between the products.  
With respect to the second term in brackets in (1), we assume that [ ]21, xxΩ=Ω  is an 
increasing function of product R&D investment, i.e., ,0>
∂
Ω∂
ix
 which is associated with 
aggregate market demand. 5  Furthermore, [ ]iii xωω =  is also an increasing function of 
product R&D investment, i.e., ,0>
∂
∂
i
i
x
ω  which is associated with firm i’s individual demand. 
For tractability, we make the following assumption. 
 
Assumption 1 
(i) [ ] ,, 221121 xxxx εε +=Ω  where ),0(≥iε 2,1=i  is the coefficient of the marginal effect 
of an increase in product R&D investment of firm i on the potential size of the market. 
(ii) [ ] ,iiii xx βω =  where ),0(≥iβ 2,1=i  is the coefficient of the marginal effect of an 
increase in product R&D investment of firm i on its own market. 
 
The budget constraint is given by ,02211 qqpqpY ++≥  where Y  is the given level of 
                                                 
5 If [ ] ,0, 21 =Ω xx  the utility function is similar to that in Häckner (2000). See also the 
appendix in Symeonidis (2003).  
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income of a representative consumer. Thus, we obtain the following expression for the 
optimal behavior of the representative consumer.6 
,],[ ijijii
i
pqqxxA
q
U
=−−=
∂
∂
q                                         (2) 
where ,)(],[ jjiiijii xxxxA εβεα +++≡  .,2,1, jiji ≠=  In particular, ],[ ji xxA  in (2) 
implies that the potential size of the market depends not only on the investment of firm i but 
also on that of firm j. Thus, ii βε +  is the own effect of firm i’s investment on its potential 
market size and jε  is the spillover effect of firm j’s investment. We obtain the following 
inverse demand function. 
,],[ jijiii qqxxAp q−−=  .,2,1, jiji ≠=                                 (3) 
 
2.2 Product R&D investment cost function 
To simplify the analysis, we assume that the cost incurred in product R&D investment is 
given by ,0,
2
][ 2 >= fxfxF iii .2,1=i  We also assume that the marginal cost of production is 
constant, i.e., ,0)( >=> cciα  .2,1=i  
 
 
3. Endogenous timing and product R&D investment with demand spillovers 
 
3.1 Noncooperative product R&D investment competition with demand spillovers 
                                                 
6 Unlike Levin and Reiss (1988), who use a multiplicative marginal utility function to make 
empirical estimation, we employ an additive marginal utility function to simplify the analysis. 
By doing so, the effect of product R&D investment can be expressed as the vertical shift of 
the inverse demand function. 
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In Stage 2, firm i chooses its output to maximize profit, i.e., .
2
)( 2iiii x
fqcp −−=Π  The 
first-order condition for maximizing the profit of firm i is given by .0=−=
∂
Π∂
ii
i
i qp
q
 
Taking (3) into account, we derive .02],[ =−− jijii qqxxA q  Thus, the Cournot−Nash 
equilibrium for firm i in the second stage is given by 
],,[
)2)(2()2)(2(
)()(2
jii
jjiiji
i xxq
xxcAcA
q ≡
+−
Γ+Φ+A
=
+−
−−−
=
qqqq
q
 ,,2,1, jiji ≠=        (4) 
where ,0))(2( >−−≡A cαq  ,02)2( >+−≡Φ iii βεq  and .)2( jjj qβεq −−≡Γ  Given 
(4), it follows that 
[ ]
,
2
)(0)(0)(
, q
<≥⇔<≥Γ⇔<≥
∂
∂
jj
j
jii E
x
xxq
                             (5) 
where ,
jj
j
jE βε
ε
+
≡  ,2,1=j  is the strength of demand spillovers. If 0>jε  and ,0=jβ  
then ,1=jE  which implies full spillovers. If 0=jε  and ,0>jβ  then ,0=jE  which 
implies no spillovers. Thus, it follows that [ ] .2,1,1,0 =∈ jE j 7 
Equation (5) shows that an increase in the product R&D investment of firm j has two 
effects on the output of firm i. The first is a positive effect, i.e., ,)2( jεq−  whereby an 
increase in the investment of firm j increases total market demand for both products, which, in 
turn, increases firm i’s individual demand and is known as the positive constructive effect. 
The second is a negative effect, i.e., ,jqβ−  whereby an increase in the investment of firm j 
increases its own demand, which in turn decreases firm i’s individual demand as a result of 
the substitutability between the competing products, which is known as the negative 
                                                 
7 We ignore the case where both 0=jε  and 0=jβ  simultaneously hold. 
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combative effect. For that reason, if the constructive effect is larger (smaller) than the 
combative effect, then an increase in the rival firm’s product R&D investment increases 
(decreases) the output of the firm. 
Let us express the profit function in Stage 1 as .
2
],[ 22 ijiii x
fxxq −=Π  Based on (4), the 
first-order condition is given by 
,0],[2 =−





Λ
Φ
=
∂
Π∂
ijii
i
i
i fxxxq
x
 ,,2,1, jiji ≠=                           (6) 
where .0)2)(2( >+−≡Λ qq  Using (4) and (6), we derive the reaction function of firm i as 
follows: 
,
2
2
2
2][ 2222 j
i
ji
i
i
ji xff
xx
Φ−Λ
ΓΦ
+
Φ−Λ
AΦ
=  ,,2,1, jiji ≠=                      (7) 
where we assume ,2 22 if Φ>Λ ,2,1=i  to maintain the second-order condition. 
Based on (7), and regarding the cross effect, which implies a strategic relationship 
between the firms, we derive the following relationship: 
.
2
)(0)(  0)(
2
2
22
q
<≥⇔<≥Γ⇔<≥
Φ−Λ
ΓΦ
= jj
i
ji
j
i E
fdx
dx
                      (8) 
Furthermore, the external effect on profit is given by 
.
2
)(0)(0)(
)2)(2(
2 q
qq
<≥⇔<≥Γ⇔<≥
+−
Γ
=
Π
jji
j
j
i Eq
dx
d
                  (9) 
To proceed with the analysis, we assume as follows. 
 
Assumption 2 
Demand spillovers for product (firm) 1 are at least as strong as those for product (firm) 2; i.e., 
.21 EE ≥   
 12 
 
Given (8), (9), and Assumption 2, we derive the following lemma. 
 
Lemma 1 
(i) If ,
221
q
>≥ EE  each firm’s reaction curve slopes upward. Hence, an increase in the 
product R&D investment of firm 2 (1) increases the profit of firm 1 (2). 
(ii) If ,
2 21
EE ≥>q  each firm’s reaction curve slopes downward. Hence, an increase in 
the product R&D investment of firm 2 (1) decreases the profit of firm 1 (2). 
(iii) If ,
2 21
EE >> q  the reaction curve for firm 1 slopes downward, whereas that for firm 
2 slopes upward. Hence, an increase in the product R&D investment of firm 2 (1) 
decreases (increases) profit of firm 1 (2). 
 
Regarding Lemma 1 (i) (Lemma 1 (ii)), if demand spillovers for both firms are stronger 
(weaker) than half of the level of product substitutability, an increase in the product R&D 
investment of the firm increases (decreases) the demand for the product of the rival firm. This 
result in turn increases (decreases) the rival firm’s output and investment, and the rival firm’s 
profit increases (decreases). Similarly, the firm’s profit increases (decreases) with an increase 
in the rival firm’s investment, which confirms that the strategic relationship between the firms 
is complementary (substitutionary). See Figure 1 (2).  
 
<INSERT FIGURES 1 AND 2 HERE> 
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Regarding Lemma 1 (iii), when there are asymmetric demand spillovers between the firms 
such that the spillover of firm 1 is larger and that of firm 2 is smaller than half of the product 
substitutability, an increase in firm 1’s investment increases firm 2’s output, whereas an 
increase in firm 2’s investment reduces firm 1’s output. In this case, firm 2 increases its output 
and investment, whereas firm 1 reduces its output and investment. As a result, firm 2’s profit 
increases, whereas firm 1’s profit falls. Thus, a relationship of strategic substitutability for 
firm 1 arises, whereas one of strategic complementarity for firm 2 arises. See Figure 3. 
 
<INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE> 
 
Taking (7) into account, we derive the SPNE in the noncooperative product R&D 
investment competition as follows. 
{ }
,
)(22 2
D
f
x jjjiNi
Γ−ΦΦ−ΛAΦ
=  ,,2,1, jiji ≠=                        (10) 
where { }{ } .0422 2211222212 >ΓΦΓΦ−Φ−ΛΦ−Λ≡ ffD  To acquire a positive equilibrium 
given by (10), we assume ,)2(2)(22 jjjjjf βq+Φ=Γ−ΦΦ>Λ .2,1=j   
   For the analysis below, in comparing the equilibrium investment level of both firms, we 
obtain the following relationship: 
)0.()}()(2{2 ))((2 )( 2121
22
2121 <>−ΦΦ++Λ+Λ−−⇔<> ββqεεq ffxx
NN  
Thus, if the effect of the investment of firm 1 on market demand is larger than that of firm 2, 
the investment level of firm 1 is larger than that of firm 2. In view of Assumption 2, for 
example, if the combative effect of both firms is almost equal, i.e., ,21 ββ ≅  or if the 
combative effect of firm 1 is not sufficiently lower than that of firm 2, and the constructive 
effect of firm 1 is larger than that of firm 2, i.e., ,21 εε >  then it holds that .21
NN xx >  
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3.2 Endogenous timing decision and a natural Stackelberg equilibrium 
We now proceed to analyze the mutually beneficial timing of product R&D investment in the 
presence of demand spillovers. By applying the definition used by Albaek (1990), we extend 
the game-theoretic framework in Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) for the endogenous timing of 
an observable delay. In other words, we show the conditions necessary to sustain a natural 
Stackelberg equilibrium, i.e., two players are able to determine the timing of their actions and 
the actions themselves. If the players choose their actions at different times, the player that 
chooses last can observe the action chosen by the initiating player. Hence, there is a 
sequential-play subgame and the Stackelberg equilibrium. If the players instead choose their 
actions at the same time, there is a simultaneous-play subgame and the Nash equilibrium.  
Consequently, based on the extended game for the endogenous timing of an observable 
delay, we compare the payoffs in the simultaneous-play game with those from the two 
sequential-play games. In this case, if one firm wants to be the first mover (superscript F), 
while the other firm wants to be the second mover (superscript S), and neither firm prefers to 
play a simultaneous Nash game (superscript N), then a natural Stackelberg equilibrium 
results.  
   Without any unnecessarily complicated calculations and taking Lemma 1 into account, the 
relationships between the firms’ profits described below are easily derived (see Figures 1, 2, 
and 3).  
 
Lemma 2 
(i) If ,
221
q
>≥ EE  it follows that Ni
F
i Π>Π  and ,
N
i
S
i Π>Π  .2,1=i  
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(ii) If ,
2 21
EE ≥>q  it follows that ,Si
N
i
F
i Π>Π>Π  .2,1=i  
(iii) If ,
2 21
EE >> q  it follows that NF 11 Π>Π  and ,11
NS Π>Π  and that 
.222
SNF Π>Π>Π  
 
Under Lemma 2 (i), just as in a standard Bertrand price competition model, both firms 
prefer being either a first mover or a second mover to playing a simultaneous Nash game. 
However, each firm prefers being a second mover to being a first mover because it holds that 
,Fi
S
i Π>Π  .2,1=i  Thus, there are two Stackelberg equilibria, i.e., ),( 21
SF xx  and 
),,( 21
FS xx  located in the Pareto-superior sets (see 1S  and 2S  in Figure 1). As proven in 
Lemma 1 in Yang et al. (2008), this result implies that the endogenous timing game leads to 
two sequential games. 
Similarly, under Lemma 2 (ii), as in a standard Cournot quantity competition model, both 
firms prefer being a first mover to being a second mover and playing a simultaneous Nash 
game (see Theorem V (A) in Hamilton and Slutsky, 1990; and Lemma 2 in Yang et al., 2008). 
Furthermore, the two Stackelberg equilibria are not located in the Pareto-superior sets (see 1S  
and 2S  in Figure 2). 
Under Lemma 2 (iii), in which there are asymmetric spillovers between the firms, firm 1 
prefers being either a first mover or a second mover to playing a simultaneous Nash game, 
whereas firm 2 prefers being a first mover to being a second mover and playing a 
simultaneous Nash game. In this case, because firm 1 expects that firm 2 will take the first 
move, firm 1 will take the second move. Taking into account the conjectural process, firm 2 
will commit to the investment in advance. In other words, this commitment is credible and 
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preferable for firm 1 because it holds that .11
FS Π>Π  Therefore, based on Theorem V (B) in 
Hamilton and Slutsky (1990), we derive the following result.8 
 
Proposition 1 
The firm producing the product with weaker (stronger) demand spillovers chooses the first 
(second) move to commit to product R&D investment. 
 
   For example, consider the situation in which a small firm that does not produce the 
recognized brand − whose product has only a small effect on market demand − decides in 
advance to invest on a small scale strategically. This investment makes the large firm with the 
recognized brand – where the product and the firm itself have a substantial effect on market 
demand − increase its product R&D investment. Accordingly, market demand increases, 
which enables both firms to raise output. As a result, both firms make higher profits. In other 
words, the small firm free-rides on the demand spillovers generated by the large firm’s 
product R&D investment.  
Based on the definition in Albaek (1990), we define the outcome under endogenous 
timing decision given in Proposition 1 as a natural Stackelberg equilibrium, i.e., 
{ }
2211
111
2
2
2 4
)(22
ΓΨΓΦ−
Γ−ΦΦ−ΛAΨ
=
D
fx F  and ,
2
2
2
2
22
1
2
21
2
1
2
1
1
FS x
ff
x
Φ−Λ
ΓΦ
+
Φ−Λ
AΦ
=                                   
where .0
2
2)2(
2
1
2
211
2
1
2
2
2 >Φ−Λ
ΓΓΦ+Φ−ΛΦ
≡Ψ
f
f  See Appendix A.  
We consider the natural Stackelberg equilibrium located in the Pareto-superior sets in the 
case of asymmetric spillovers (see point 2S  in Figure 3). Compared with the SPNE in the 
                                                 
8 In a rent-seeking model, Leininger (1993) demonstrates that a weaker (stronger) player 
moves first (second).  
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natural Stackelberg equilibrium, when firm 1 (2) produces the product with stronger (weaker) 
demand spillovers, its product R&D investment increases (reduces), i.e., NS xx 11 > and
NF xx 22 < . In this case, regarding the output of firm 1, based on (4), we have the following 
relationship: 
.0)()()(],[)(],[ 22211121112111 ≤>−Γ+−Φ⇔≡≤>≡
NFNSNNNFSS xxxxxxqqxxqq   (11) 
Thus, it directly follows that ,11
NS qq >  because .02 <Γ  Compared with those in the SPNE, 
the product R&D investment costs increase. However, the extent of the increase in the output 
of firm 1 is sufficiently large. Thus, it follows that .11
NS Π>Π   
Conversely, we derive the output of firm 2 as follows: 
.0)()()(],[)(],[ 11122221222112 ≤>−Γ+−Φ⇔≡≤>≡
NSNFNNNFSF xxxxxxqqxxqq   (12) 
Hence, we derive { } { }.)(2sgn)()(sgn 21211222111222 ΓΓ−ΦΦΦ−ΛΦΓ=−Γ+−Φ fxxxx NSNF  It 
follows that ,0)(2 21211
2
2 >ΓΓ−ΦΦΦ−ΛΦ f  because 02 >Ψ  as denoted above. Thus, the 
output of firm 2 decreases more than that in the SPNE. However, although the output 
decreases because the extent of the decrease in product R&D investment costs outweighs that 
of the decrease in revenue, it follows that .22
NF Π>Π  
   Furthermore, the relationship between the product R&D investments of both firms in the 
natural Stackelberg equilibrium, i.e., ,)( 21
FS xx ≤>  is generally ambiguous because it 
depends on the parameters for spillovers and product substitutability, i.e., ,iε  ,iβ  ,2,1=i  
and .q  However, for example, assuming ,021 =>= εεε  ,021 >== βββ  and 
,0)2( >−− qβεq  we can derive FNNS xxxx 2211 )( >>>  (see Appendix B). Based on (4), it 
follows that ],[],[ 21222111
FSFFSS xxqqxxqq ≡>≡  in the Cournot duopolistic market. 
   Compared with SPNE, the Pareto optimality of terms of profits persists in the natural 
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Stackelberg equilibrium; however, the effect on consumer surplus is ambiguous. That is, 
consumer surplus is given by [ ] ( ) ,
2
1
21
2
2
2
122112,1 qqqqqpqpqqUCS q++=−−≡ where 
[ ],),( 221 xxxqq ii =  .2,1=i We derive as follows. 
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qq  where  
0
)2( 21
2
2
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2
1
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1
1
1 <
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ΛΓ
=
∂
∂
+
∂
∂
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x
q
x
x
x
q  and .0
)2(
2)2(
2
1
2
211
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1
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
2 >
Φ−ΛΛ
ΓΓΦ+Φ−ΛΦ
=
∂
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+
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∂
∂
f
f
x
q
x
x
x
q   
The first (second) term expresses the effect of a change of the investment of firm 2 on 
surplus regarding consumption of product 1 (2). Unless the magnitude of the effect expressed 
in the first term is sufficiently large, a decrease in the investment of firm 2 from the SPNE to 
the natural Stackelberg equilibrium reduces consumer surplus.  
Furthermore, evaluating the social optimal investments at the SPNE, we derive  
( ) ( ),3
0
ii
j
ii
i
x
i
qq
x
W
i
i
Γ+Φ





Λ
+Γ+Φ





Λ
=
∂
∂
=
∂
Π∂
qq  ,,2,1, jiji ≠=  
where 0)2()1)(2( 2 >−++−=Γ+Φ iiii βqεqqq  and ,)3)(2(3 iiii qβεqqq −+−=Γ+Φ  
.2,1=i  If it holds that ,2,1,)3)(2( =>+− iii qβεqq  then we have .0
0
>
∂
∂
=
∂
Π∂
i
i
x
ix
W  Thus, we 
understand that the levels of product R&D investment in the SPNE is lower than those in the 
social optimality. Considering ,2211
FNNS xxxx >>>  this implies either that the levels of the 
investments of both firms in the natural Stackelberg equilibrium are lower than the levels in 
the social optimality or that at least the level of firm 2, which is a first mover with a small 
impact on the market, is lower than that in the social optimality. 
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3.3 Implications: Product R&D investment as endogenous sunk costs9 
Based on the seminal works, of John Sutton (1989, 1992, 1998), i.e., the Sutton approach 
denoted by Etro (2013), with respect to the outcomes demonstrated above, i.e., Proposition 1, 
we take the view that product R&D investment cost in our model can be regarded as 
“endogenous sunk costs”.10 In this case, when a small firm commits to a first move to invest, 
it implies that the small firm incurs a low investment costs to enter the market in advance. 
This low entry costs leads to low levels of quality. Otherwise, if it chooses a second move, the 
small firm must incur large investment costs. However, a large firm prefers the second move 
to the first move, which implies that the large firm makes a substantial investment to improve 
the quality level and incurs large entry costs enhancing aggregate market demand. As a result, 
the market structure is organized such that the small (large) firm competes by providing a low 
(high) quality of the products and services. 
   Secondly, we consider how product R&D investments under endogenous timing affect 
potential market size (i.e., ,)(],[ jjiiijii xxxxA εβεα +++≡ jiji ≠= ,2,1, ), regarding both 
firms in point 1S  and 2S  in Figure 3. In this case, we derive as follows. 
)())((][][ 11122221222
FSSF xxxxSASA −+−+=− εβε   
and 
),())((][][ 22211111121
SFFS xxxxSASA −+−+=− εβε  
where 011 >−
FS xx  and .022 <−
SF xx  For example, in assuming ,021 =>= εεε  
,021 >== βββ  ,0)2( >−− qβεq  and ,βε >  if a small (large) firm incurs a low (high) 
entry (i.e., investment) cost, the potential market size may increase more than in the opposite 
                                                 
9 This part is based on the suggestions of the editor and anonymous referees. 
10 See also Matraves (1999) and Gruber (2002). 
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case.11 As a result, the market size is determined by the magnitude of entry costs through the 
endogenous timing decisions before Cournot competition in the market. 
Finally, compared with the outcomes based on the vertical differentiation model, i.e., Jinji 
(2004), we can alternatively interpret the outcomes under endogenous timing as follows. Let 
us assume .1=q  This assumption implies that the products are homogenous and a 
horizontal product differentiation between the products thus vanishes. Hence, we can confirm 
that Lemmas 1 and 2 and Proposition 1 hold. In other words, our model addressing product 
(i.e., quality-improving) R&D investment is formally similar to the vertical differentiation 
model. Jinji (2004) demonstrates that the firm producing the low (high) quality product 
chooses the quality level first (second).12 However, in our model, a small (large) firm with a 
small (large) effect on market demand commits to a small (large) product R&D investment 
first (second). As a result, the small (large) firm provides the low (high) quality product. 
 
 
4. Discussions 
 
4.1 Endogenous timing of process R&D investment competition with technology spillovers 
As discussed in the Introduction, it is worth relating the demand spillovers examined to the 
technology spillovers. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the outcomes of endogenous timing 
depend on the type of technology spillovers.  
We assume the following standard inverse demand function in a horizontally 
differentiated products market: 
                                                 
11 Given the example, we can derive the same result by comparing the SPNE and the natural 
Stackelberg equilibrium, i.e., N and 2S . 
12 See Lambertini and Tedeschi (2007), and Lambertini and Tampieri (2012). 
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.,2,1,, jijiqqp jii ≠=−−= qα                                       (13) 
First, we assume the impact of technology spillover on the marginal cost of production 
presented by De Bondt and Henriques (1995) and Amir, et al. (2000) as follows. 
,,2,1,, jijixxcc jiii ≠=−−= ε                                       (14) 
where ji xε  represents technology spillovers, in which [ ]1,0∈iε  measures the extent to 
which the benefits of firm j’s R&D investment are available to firm i, which implies that firms 
can reap the rewards of another firm’s technology, i.e., incoming spillovers. In this case, the 
Cournot−Nash equilibrium is given by 
.,2,1,,
)2()2(
jiji
xx
q jiiii ≠=Λ
−+−+A
=
qεqε
                         (15) 
If the level of technology available to firm i from the rival firm’s investment is higher 
(lower) than half of the product substitutability, then an increase in the investment by firm j 
increases (decreases) the output of firm i as follows. 
.,2,1,,
2
)(0)( jiji
x
q
i
j
i ≠=<≥⇔<≥
∂
∂ q
ε                                 (16) 
Alternatively, we assume the impact of the technology spillover on the marginal cost of 
production presented by Atallah (2005) as follows. 
,,2,1,, jijixxcc jjii ≠=−−= ε                                       (17) 
where jj xε  is the technology spillover, in which [ ]1,0∈jε  represents the leakage of 
technological knowledge from firm j’s R&D investment to firm i. In Stage 2, the 
Cournot−Nash equilibrium is given by 
.,2,1,,
)2()2(
jiji
xx
q jjiii ≠=Λ
−+−+A
=
qεqε
                         (18) 
If the level of technological leakage from firm j is higher (lower) than half of the product 
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substitutability, then an increase in investment by firm j increases (decreases) the output of 
firm i as follows. 
.,2,1,,
2
)(0)( jiji
x
q
j
j
i ≠=<≥⇔<≥
∂
∂ q
ε                                 (19) 
Because it follows that ,2,1, == jE jj ε  in assuming ,2,1,1 ==+ iii βε  in (4), we derive 
(19). Thus, the effects of technological leakage from the rival firm assumed by Atallah (2005) 
are formally equivalent to the effects of the demand spillovers in our model.  
To demonstrate that the endogenous timing of process R&D investment depends on the 
type of technology spillovers, let us assume .
2 ji
ε
q
ε >>  In this case, in the models of De 
Bondt and Henriques (1995) and Amir et al. (2000), if firm i (j) has a higher (lower) 
capability of absorbing the technology generated by firm j’s (i’s) process R&D investment, 
then the reaction function is upward (downward) sloping. Thus, firm i (j) has a strategic 
complementary (substitutionary) relationship with firm j (i), and we determine that the firm 
with a higher (lower) capability of absorbing the technology chooses to move first (second). 
The result is the same as Theorem 5 in Amir, et al. (2000). 
Conversely, the model in Atallah (2005) predicts that the first mover is firm j, which 
suffers only a small leakage of technological knowledge from its own process R&D 
investment. Thus, we summarize the result as follows. 
 
Corollary 1 
The firm with smaller (larger) technology spillovers of process R&D investment chooses to 
invest first (second). 
 
This result is contrary to the results of De Bondt and Henriques (1995) and Amir et al. 
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(2000), but is formally similar to Proposition 1 in the case of demand spillovers.  
 
4.2 The Bertrand duopoly case with demand spillovers 
We confirm whether the endogenous timing decision depends on the mode of competition. 
Considering (2), the direct demand function of product i is given by 
{ } { }
,
)1()1()1(
Σ
+−−−++−+−
= jijjjiiii
ppxx
q
qqβεqβεqqα
 ,,2,1, jiji ≠= (20) 
where ).1)(1( qq +−=Σ  In this case, we obtain  
.)(0)(
)1(
q
qβεq
<≥Ε⇔<≥
Σ
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=
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j
jj
j
i
x
q
                              (21) 
In Stage 2, firm i chooses a price to maximize its profit, i.e., ].[)( iiiii xFqcp −−=Π  The 
first-order condition for maximizing the profit of firm i is given by .0=
Σ
−
−=
∂
Π∂ cpq
p
i
i
i
i  
Considering (20), we derive 
{ } { } .02)1()1()1( =++−−−++−+− cppqq jijjjiii qqβqεβqεqα   
Hence, the price of product i in the second stage is given by 
[ ],, jiij
B
ji
B
i
B
i xxpc
xx
p ≡+
Λ
Γ+Φ+A
=  .,2,1, jiji ≠=                    (21) 
We note parameters ,0))(2)(1( >−+−≡A cB αqq  ,0)2()2)(1( 2 >−++−≡Φ ii
B
i βqεqq  
and ,)2)(1( jj
B
j qβεqq −+−≡Γ  where superscript B denotes Bertrand duopoly. Given (21), 
the following relationship holds: 
[ ] [ ] ,)(0)(0)(, q<≥ΕΘ⇔<≥Γ⇔<≥
∂
∂
j
B
j
j
jii
x
xxp
                         (22) 
where [ ] 1
2
8 12
<
Ε−+Ε
≡ΕΘ
−−
jj
j  and [ ] ,0>ΕΘ′ j  .2,1=j   
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Equation (22) demonstrates that if the parameter representing the strength of demand 
spillovers for product j, i.e., [ ]jΕΘ , is larger (smaller) than a certain value of product 
substitutability, i.e., ,q  then an increase in the product R&D investment of firm j increases 
(decreases) the price of product i. That is, firm i increases (decreases) its price because the 
constructive effect on product i’s demand that is induced by an increase in total market 
demand is larger (smaller) than the combative effect on product i’s demand resulting from the 
substitutability between the products. 
In Stage 1, firm i chooses its profit-maximizing product R&D investment. Hence, the 
profit function is represented by [ ] ,
2
, 2ijiii x
fxxR −=Π  where [ ] [ ] .,,
2
Σ
= jiijii
xxp
xxR  The 
first-order condition is given by: 
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 .,2,1, jiji ≠=               (23) 
We derive the second-order condition, the cross effect, and the external effect on the profit 
of the rival firm, as follows.  
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and 
[ ] ,0)(0)(,2 <≥Γ⇔<≥



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where .,2,1, jiji ≠=   
To proceed with the analysis, it follows under Assumption 2 that [ ] [ ]2211 ΕΘ≡Θ≥ΕΘ≡Θ  
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and that 21 Θ=Θ  if and only if .21 Ε=Ε  Given (25) and (26), we derive the following 
lemma. 
 
Lemma 3 
(i) If ,21 q>Θ≥Θ  each firm’s reaction curve slopes upward. Hence, an increase in the 
product R&D investment for product 2 (1) increases the revenue of firm 1 (2). 
(ii) If ,21 Θ≥Θ>q  each firm’s reaction curve slopes downward. Hence, an increase in 
the product R&D investment for product 2 (1) decreases the revenue of firm 1 (2). 
(iii) If ,21 Θ>>Θ q  firm 1’s reaction curve slopes downward, whereas firm 2’s reaction 
curve slopes upward. Hence, an increase in the product R&D investment for product 2 
(1) decreases (increases) the revenue of firm 1 (2). 
 
   Given Lemmas 2 and 3, we can obtain the same results in the case of a horizontally 
differentiated Bertrand duopoly as those in Proposition 1. However, in the vertical 
differentiation model, the endogenous timing of the quality decision depends on the mode of 
completion, e.g., Lambertini (1996, 1999) and Jinji (2004); however, the endogenous timing 
decision of the product R&D investment competition in a horizontally differentiated model is 
independent of the mode of competition. Furthermore, by the same method employed in the 
analysis of the Cournot duopoly case, assuming 021 =>= εεε  and ,021 >== βββ  we 
can derive .2211
FBNBNBSB xxxx >>>  
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5. Concluding Remarks 
 
We have considered endogenous timing decisions based on a model of product 
(quality-improving) R&D investment with demand spillovers in a horizontally differentiated 
duopoly. Furthermore, we have addressed the same problem in the case of process 
(cost-reducing) R&D investment with technology spillovers and in the case of a horizontally 
differentiated Bertrand duopoly.  
We have found that if the strategic relationship of the rival firm regarding the firm is one 
of substitutability (complementarity), and the external effect on the rival firm’s profit is 
negative (positive), the firm chooses to move first (second) under endogenous timing, 
regardless of the mode of competition. In this case, the Stackelberg equilibrium results, which 
is Pareto-superior for the firms but may also decrease consumer surplus. 
   We have considered the economic implications of the Stackelberg equilibrium under 
endogenous timing, considering the views of “endogenous sunk costs” and “endogenous 
entry”. In particular, when there are asymmetric firms with various specific resources and 
properties, the market structure is organized such that a small firm that affects the market 
demand little or not at all commits to a low investment (i.e., entry) cost early, whereas a large 
firm that exerts substantial influence on the market commits to a high investment (i.e., entry) 
cost. As a result, the former (latter) competes in the market with a lower (higher) quality 
product. In terms of future developments, the duopoly model might be extended to an 
oligopoly model, and we might consider an endogenous market structure (see Etro, 2013). 
Furthermore, we have shown that the endogenously decided order in the natural 
Stackelberg equilibrium is preferable to other equilibria for both firms, which implies that 
both firms non-cooperatively collude with respect to investment levels before market 
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competition. However, we have not addressed cooperative R&D investment, R&D 
agreements, or joint ventures in the presence of spillovers.13 However, since the seminal 
paper of D’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), the problem has been analyzed theoretically 
and empirically in much of the related literature. For example, Marini and Rodano (2013) and 
Marini et al. (2014) recently analyzed the possibility of forming R&D agreements 
(cooperative ventures). Furthermore, Foros et al. (2002) consider roaming policy in the 
market for mobile telecommunications. In this model, firms collude at the investment stage, 
although they compete in the retail market, i.e., semi-collusion. In the future, we will examine 
how R&D agreement and cooperation affect endogenous entry and market structure. 
 
 
Appendix A: The Stackelberg equilibrium in the case of asymmetric spillovers 
In the case of asymmetric spillovers, i.e., ,
2
0 2121 EE >>⇔Γ>>Γ
q
 we assume that 
firm 2 (1) chooses to move first (second) in product R&D investment. Taking into account the 
reaction function of firm 1 given by (7), firm 2 chooses its product R&D investment to 
maximize the profit given by .
2
]),([ 22
2
22122 x
fxxxq −=Π  The first-order condition is given 
by ,0]),([2 222122
2
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Π fxxxxq
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d  where .
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2
2
2 Φ−Λ
ΓΓΦ+Φ−ΛΦ
≡Ψ
f
f  To 
sustain an interior equilibrium, we assume .02 >Ψ  Furthermore, the second-order condition 
is .02 22
2 >Ψ−Λ f   
Based on the first-order condition and (4), we have  
                                                 
13 One of our anonymous referees comments on this point. With respect to cooperative 
product R&D investment (i.e., semi-collusion) in the case of the Bertrand duopoly, see 
Toshimitsu (2012). 
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.0)2(22 222
2
1122 =ΨΦ−Λ−ΓΨ+AΨ xfx                               (A.1) 
Substituting the reaction function of firm 1 given by (7) into (A.1), we derive the 
Stackelberg equilibrium as follows. 
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   In the case of asymmetric spillovers, bearing in mind (10) and (A.2), we obtain FN xx 22 >
directly. Furthermore, because the reaction function of firm 1 is a decreasing function of the 
investment of firm 2, as in (A.3), it follows that ).()( 211211
NNFS xxxxxx =>=  
 
Appendix B: An example  
From (A.3), we have the following relationship: 
,}2){(2)( 2211121
FFS xHxx ΓΦ−≤>AΦ⇔≤>                            (B.1) 
where .02 21
2
1 >Φ−Λ≡ fH  Furthermore, given the assumption regarding the parameters, 
we have ,02)2(1 >+−=Φ βεq  ,022 >=Φ β  ,0)2(1 >−−=Γ qβεq  and .02 <−=Γ qβ   
Substituting (A.2) into the right-hand side of (B.1), through complicated and tedious 
calculations, we obtain the following relationship: 
        ,0)(4)( 21
2
1121 ≤>ΓΓΦ−⇔≤> YZHxx
FS                               (B.2) 
Where 02)(2)( 2111212121
2 >ΓΓΦ−Γ−Γ+ΦΦΦ+Φ−ΦΛ≡ fZ and .0212 >Γ−Γ+Φ≡Y  
Because ,02 <Γ  it follows that .04 21
2
11 >ΓΓΦ− YZH  Thus, we have .21
FS xx >  
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Figure 1 
The case of strong demand spillovers: 
221
q
>≥ EE  
The shaded area represents the Pareto-superior sets 
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Figure 2  
The case of weak demand spillovers: 212
EE ≥>q  
The shaded area represents the Pareto-superior sets 
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Figure 3  
The case of asymmetric demand spillovers: 21 2
EE >> q  
The shaded area represents the Pareto-superior sets 
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